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I. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court took jurisdiction, initially, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal1 for decision to this 
Court, the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(4). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Issue 1 and Standard of Review: 
Appellee moved for summary judgment on its affirmative counterclaim to quiet 
title to certain real property. Did the trial court err in how it applied the respective 
procedural burdens borne by the parties? The standard of review for that issue is 
correctness. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, fflj 1 & 6, 117 P.3d 600, 601. 
Issue 2.a. and Standard of Review: 
Did the trial court also then err in quieting title in appellee, determining that no 
title passed to appellant's predecessor in interest, via patent, in 1930? The standard of 
review for that issue is correctness. Orvis, 117 P.3d at 601. ("An appellate court 
reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment' for correctness.") (quoting Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, fl 8, 152 P.3d 
312); see also, Harmon City Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995) 
("Because the propriety of... a summary judgment... presents questions of law, we 
accord no deference to the trial court's determinations and review the issues under a 
correctness standard.") & Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, at 1J10, 48 P.3d 235, 238 
("We review the trial court's summary judgment for correctness, considering only 
whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed 
1
 By order dated June 16, 2008, this Court consolidated CA-20080358 with this 
appeal as both are from judgments in the same trial court proceeding. 
1 
issues of material fact existed."). 
Issue 2.b. and Standard of Review: 
Did the trial court err when it ruled that appellant could not assert the federal 
statutory six-year statute of limitations defense to bar appellee's quiet title 
counterclaim? The standard of review for that issue is correctness based on the same 
case law cited as to Issue 2.a., supra. 
Issue 3 and Standard of Review: 
Did the trial court err in 2007 when, in spite of the parties' joint inaction since 
the 2005 summary judgment ruling hearing, it dismissed with prejudice appellant's 
claims and defenses based on adverse possession for failure to prosecute them but did 
not also dismiss with prejudice appellee's counterclaim? A trial court's order dismissing 
an action with prejudice for failure to prosecute is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, H 15, 46 P.3d 753, 756. 
III. STATUTES AND RULES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(b). Dismissal of Actions. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without 
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for 
a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no 
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for 
dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits. 
/// 
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UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(a) & (c)-(e). Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
20 days from the commencement of the action or service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is 
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before 
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist 
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a 
party failing to file such a response. 
43 U.S.C. § 1166. Limitations of suits to annul patents 
Suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent shall only be brought 
within six years after the date of the issuance of such patents. 
/// 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves competing claims of title under federal patents to about thirty 
one acres in Summit County, Utah. Almost eighty years ago, a regional federal land 
office in Salt Lake City issued two certain patents, the Clegg mining patent in 1929 and 
the Clark homestead grazing patent in 1930. Ownership claims arising from them have 
come into conflict between Gillmor, who is the successor to the Clark patent, and Blue 
Ledge, which is the successor to the Clegg patent, as follows. 
In 1917, a person named John A. Clark applied for a homestead grazing patent. 
Mr. Clark was married to Johanna A. Clark. After Mr. Clark's death, Ms. Clark was 
substituted on the Clark homestead patent application. Between 1925 and 1927, a 
person named Charles L. Clegg formally protested Ms. Clark's patent application in a 
land office administrative proceeding. In 1929, the United States issued Mr. Clegg a 
mining patent. In 1930- after and notwithstanding Mr. Clegg's protest to the Clark 
application- the same land office issued Ms. Clark a homestead patent. 
Appellant maintains that Ms. Clark was a successor in ownership to the United 
States via her homestead patent. Mr. Clegg had six years to file an action to try and 
annul the Clark Patent. Mr. Clegg never challenged the issuance of the Clark patent. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Disposition By Trial Court 
In November 2005, a trial court of the Third Judicial District in the Summit County 
Department denied Blue Ledge's motion for summary judgment as to Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim and granted partial summary judgment to Blue Ledge on its quiet title 
claim subject to the outcome of Gillmor's adverse possession claim. In deciding Blue 
Ledge's motion for summary judgment, the trial court acknowledged that the evidence 
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raised unanswered questions about the parties' conflicting claims of right. Yet, the 
Court granted Blue Ledge's motion. The trial court rested exclusively on an incorrect 
legal presumption advanced by Blue Ledge that a patent that issues second in time is 
void from the beginning. The District Court wrote on November 8, 2005: 
"While the court would like to give a presumption of regularity to the 1930 [Clark] 
patent, the court sees no possible benefit in making a factual determination 
about the incidents of that day. Nothing could be provided that is meaningful, in 
the court's mind, to the events of that day and why things happened as they did. 
No witnesses should shed any light on motivation and meaning, and the court 
believes the 1929 [Clegg] patent conveys title and it is unbroken to defendant 
[Blue Ledge.] 
DISCUSSION 
QUIET TITLE 
As to the motion concerning this claim of defendants, the court finds no 
factual disputes that are material and judgment should be granted as a matter of 
law to defendant. 
The 1929 [Clegg] patent makes any further attempts at conveyance, or 
any later patents of the same, void, ab initio. The statute of limitations applies 
only to the United States or its successors, and is not applicable here. A 
collateral attack on the homestead [Clark] patent is allowed by defendant. The 
Court sees nothing but a legal dispute about the effect of these 1929 and 1930 
patents." 
®. 436-437) 
So, in spite of an applicable legal presumption advanced by Gillmor- viz., that a 
patent is presumed valid if issued- and in spite of evidence tending to rebut the 
incorrect legal presumption advanced by Blue Ledge, the trial court resolved what it saw 
as "nothing but a legal dispute" by choosing the legal presumption that led to summary 
judgment and that essentially avoided an adjudication of the facts demonstrating 
conflicting claims of right. 
Neither party moved the case forward until, in September 2007, Gillmor 
approached Blue Ledge regarding settlement and indicated that she would file a motion 
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to revisit the partial summary judgment on the federal patent conflict if settlement did 
not occur. In October 2007, Blue Ledge's response to that settlement overture was to 
file, under UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(b), a motion to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession 
claim for failure to prosecute it. Also in October 2007, Gillmor certified her adverse 
possession claim ready for trial and filed, under UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(b), a motion 
requesting the trial court to reconsider its 2005 summary judgment ruling. The trial 
court denied Gillmior's motion but granted Blue Ledge's motion, dismissing Gillmor's 
adverse possession claim with prejudice in December 2007. 
In January 2008, Gillmor moved, under UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b), for the trial court in 
the interests of justice to dismiss both parties' claims since both had failed to prosecute 
them, or alternatively, dismiss her claim without prejudice. The trial court denied that 
motion. On March 21, 2008, the trial court entered a final judgment for Blue Ledge 
from which this appeal lies. R. 645-647 & Addendum hereto. 
C. Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case 
1. The real property at issue in this case comprises portions of the surface 
estate of three patented alleged mining claims. It is hereafter referred to as "the 
disputed property." R. 359 & 396. 
2. In 1917, John Clark applied to the United States of America Department 
of the Interior, within the regional Land Office located in Salt Lake City, Utah ("Land 
Office"), for a homestead patent on land on which he had made entry, land that 
includes the disputed property. Ex. A to R. 522-526. 
3. Between 1917 and 1926, Mr. Clark died and Ms. Johanna A. Clark his 
widowed spouse was substituted for Mr. Clark on the homestead patent application. Ex. 
A to R. 522-526. 
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4. Between 1925 and 1927, Charles D. Clegg protested Ms. Clark's patent 
application in an administrative proceeding before the Land Office docketed as "Contest 
No. 4781." Ex. A to R. 522-526 & Ex. A to 536-539. 
5. The crux of Contest No. 4781 was Mr. Clegg's allegation of mining claims, 
underneath the ground of the disputed property, that allegedly dated back to before Mr. 
Clark's 1917 homestead patent application, specifically, alleged to date to 1916. Ex. A 
to R. 522-526 & Ex. A to 536-539. 
6. Ms. Clark at one point, but for a reason not apparent from the record of 
Contest No. 4781 that is a part of the record of this case, conceded to judgment to at 
least some part of Mr. Clegg's protest. Exs. A, B & C to 536-539. 
7. On May 22, 1929, the Land Office issued as to the disputed property a 
mining patent to Mr. Clegg, the predecessor in interest of appellant Blue Ledge. Ex. C 
to R. 332-352. 
8. On December 20, 1930, the Land Office issued as to the disputed 
property the homestead patent for which Mr. and Ms. Clark had applied. Ex. A of Att. 1 
to R. 358-383. 
9. Mr. Clegg never filed an action challenging the Clark patent. 
10. As part of a Judgment and Decree of Partition entered on February 14, 
1981, in a partition action initiated by Edward L. Gillmor in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 223998, Frank Charles 
Gillmor was awarded certain real property located in Summit County, Utah, which was 
part of a larger parcel more particularly known as the Clark Ranch Property. The Clark 
Ranch includes the disputed property, fl 5 of Att. 3 to R. 358-383 & Att. 4 to R. 358-
383. 
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11. The source title document for the Clark Ranch Property is the Clark 
Patent. U 6 of & Ex. A to Att. 3, to R. 358-383. 
12. The appellant Nadine Gillmor is the spouse of the since deceased Frank 
Gillmor and title of the Clark Ranch passed to her in 1995 when Frank Gillmor died. 
W s 1-3 of Att. 3 to R. 358-383. 
13. In 1983, the United Park City Mines Company (hereinafter "United Park") 
claimed title to the surface of certain portions of the Clark Ranch by reason of mining 
claims which Unfed Park held descended down from the Clegg Patent. Included in the 
surface rights claimed by United Park was an alleged overlap of the Clegg Patent onto 
part of the Clark Ranch. Frank and Mrs. Gillmor instructed Frank's attorneys, Hal 
Christensen and H. James Clegg, to try and resolve these conflicts with United Park, 
but a settlement was never reached. UH's 7-13 of Att. 3 to R. 358-383 & Atts. 2 & 4 to 
R. 358-383. 
14. In each of the years from 1983 through November, 1995, the portion of 
the Clark Ranch Property awarded to Frank was leased by Frank and/or Mrs. Gillmor to 
others who used the property for livestock grazing. From 1983 through 1995, Mrs. 
Gillmor visited the Clark Ranch Property each year during the grazing season and often 
several times per year. As a consequence of these visits, Mrs. Gillmor knows that the 
Clark Ranch Property, including the disputed area in the Northwest Quarter of Section 
11, was all unfenced and open pasture and that pasture was grazed by Frank and Mrs. 
Gillmor's lessees during each of those years. Mrs. Gillmor is unaware of any other use 
under claim of right or title that was made on the Clark Ranch Property including the 
disputed area in Section 11 during any of those years. fl 14 of Att. 3 to R. 358-383. 
15. In each of the years from 1983 through 1995, the Summit County 
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Assessor's Office assessed property taxes against the surface ownership on the Clark 
Ranch Property, including the property on which the Clegg and Woodrow mining claims 
overlapped. The property tax notices pertaining to said surface ownership of the Clark 
Ranch Property were sent to Frank and/or Mrs. Gillmor in each of those years and 
Frank and Mrs. Gillmor timely paid those property taxes. U 15 of and Ex. B to Att. 3, to 
R. 358-383. 
16. In 1995, Mrs. Gillmor sued Blue Ledge Corporation for adverse 
possession and Blue Ledge Corporation counterclaimed to quiet title claiming that the 
Clegg and Woodrow Mining Claims voided the Clark Patent. R. 114-118 & 135-152. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Gillmor respectfully submits that the trial court has made several 
decisions requiring reversal. In considering appellee Blue Ledge's motion for summary 
judgment, it did not apply the correct procedural burden on Blue Ledge or accord 
Gillmor the benefit of legal presumptions and reasonable evidentiary inferences. The 
trial court also did not look to the correct federal laws in determining Blue Ledge was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and Gillmor could not avail herself of an 
applicable statute of limitations. Finally, when both parties had delayed the trial court 
abused its discretion in dismissing Gillmor's claim certified for trial but awarded Blue 
Ledge a final judgment on its counterclaim. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HOLD BLUE LEDGE TO THE CORRECT 
PROCEDURAL BURDEN IT WAS REQUIRED TO MEET TO OBTAIN PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS AFFIRMATIVE QUIET TITLE CLAIM. 
Blue Ledge moved for summary judgment on its claim to quiet title. Blue Ledge 
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thus needed to "show both that there is no material issue of fact and that [it] the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 10, 117 P.3d 
600, 602 (citing UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c)(emphasis in original). 
Where the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must 
establish each element of his claim in order to show that he is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In order to meet his initial burden on summary 
judgment, therefore, [Appellees] must [have] presented] evidence sufficient to 
establish that [quieting title in its favor] is appropriate under the facts of the case, 
and that no material issues of fact remain. The burden on summary judgment 
then shifts to the nonmoving party [Appellants] to identify contested material 
facts, or legal flaws in the [claim that title should be quieted in Appellee]. 
Id. Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court did not hold Blue Ledge to that 
burden. 
Also, it is settled that "[d]oubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of 
fact must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before 
judgment can be rendered against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before 
the court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery. The trial 
court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility." Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) 
(footnotes omitted). 
A. A STRONG PRESUMPTION EXISTS IN FAVOR OF THE VALIDITY OF THE CLARK 
PATENT. 
At the threshold of the trial court's inquiry on summary judgment, it was 
confronted with the strong presumption in that the Clark Patent held by Gillmor is valid 
in all respects. The United States Supreme Court has commanded that this 
presumption be afforded to the Clark Patent, as being one of the variety of federal land 
patents: 
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[A]ll the presumptions are in favor of the validity of the title, and in regard to 
which a wise policy has forbidden that they should be thus attacked, and those 
like the present, in which an action is brought in a court of chancery to vacate, to 
set aside, or to annul the patent itself, or other evidence of title from the United 
States, is very obvious. 
United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co.et al, 121 U.S. 325, 379 7 S.Ct.1015, 1028 
(1887)(c/f/ng United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61). In order to overcome that 
strong presumption, clear and convincing evidence is required: 
In either case, however, the deliberate action of the tribunals, to which 
the law commits the determination of all preliminary questions and the 
control of the processes by which this evidence of title is issued to the 
grantee, demands that to annul such an instrument and destroy the 
title claimed under it, the facts on which this action is asked for must 
be clearly established by evidence entirely satisfactory to the court, 
and that the case itself must be within the class of causes for which such 
an instrument may be avoided. 
Id. (emphasis added). Also, 
[t]o avoid such 'solemn evidences of title emanating from the government of the 
United States under its official seal' requires the observance of the early 
established rule that it 'cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence 
which leaves the issue in doubt' even more than in suits between private 
parties for such cancellations. Only 'that class of evidence which commands 
respect, and that amount of it which produces conviction, shall make such an 
attempt successful.' 
United States v. Otley, 127 F.2d. 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1942). 
B. BLUE LEDGE DID NOT PRESENT UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE TO OVERCOME 
THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE CLARK PATENT IS VALID. 
Not only did Blue Ledge not offer uncontroverted, clear and convincing evidence 
to overcome that presumption of validity, at the oral argument in 2005, Blue Ledge's 
counsel effectively admitted that Blue Ledge could not offer evidence to explain why the 
Clark Patent was issued that would establish any error in its issuance: 
"We claim to have been issued a mining patent on May 22, 1929. We seek to 
quiet title against a competing claim held by Ms. Gillmor, under which she claims 
to have a right to this property pursuant to a grazing patent that was issued on 
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December 20, 1930. 
We have a hunch that the reason this becomes an issue dates back to 1929 
when my client received a mining patent... . In that patent the property was 
described by a metes and bounds description. What should have happened at 
that point is that the federal surveyor should have gone back to the map, and 
should have drawn in the land that had been patented to [Blue Ledge's 
predecessor in interest]. 
In 1930, about a year and a half after my client's predecessor had received its 
mining patent... a woman named Johanna Clark received a grazing homestead 
patent from the federal government for what was known as the 'Clark Ranch.'... 
We think that what happened is that the surveyor had not gone back in the 
meantime, after my client's predecessor received its mining patent, because it 
was by metes and bounds. If you look at the patent my client's predecessor 
received, it's a hairy list of metes and bounds descriptions and they didn't go 
back- the surveyor didn't go back immediately and plot all that on the map. So 
in 1930, when the government went to give Johanna Clark her grazing 
patent, which is for the surface estate only, they goofed, because the mining 
patent hadn't been plotted on the map."2 
The Land Office issued the Clark Patent only a year after it issued the Clegg Patent. 
Blue Ledge's "guess" is that the land office "goofed," perhaps because the Clegg Patent 
was not clearly described. Blue Ledge's guesswork, however, is plainly insufficient to 
overcome the strong presumption in favor of validity of the Clark Patent and therefore 
Blue Ledge can in no way be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on summary 
judgment. "[T]he party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the benefit of 'all 
applicable presumptions, inferences and intendments... .'" Med-Trust Reinsurance Co. 
Ltd. v. U.S., 37 Fed. CI 428, 434 (1997) (quoting H.F. Allen Orchards v. U.S., 749 F.2d 
1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also, Massey, 2007 UT 10, U 8, 152 P.3d at 314-315 
(Utah Supreme Court held summary judgment movants were entitled to quiet title only 
because they had presented evidence to successfully rebut and thus overcome the 
2
 R. 627 at 2-4. 
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statutory legal presumption of tax deed validity resting with non-movant). 
Mr. Clegg had formally protested Ms. Clark's patent application at the Land 
Office, but the Land Office issued the Clark Patent anyway. In 1928 the Land Office 
ruled that Ms. Clark's homestead entry was "to the extent of the conflict hereby 
cancelled." However, that ruling begs the question of whether there was any "conflict" 
between the two patents. No evidence whatsoever was presented on that point by Blue 
Ledge and no evidence whatsoever was presented to explain why the Land Office 
concluded that it could issue lawfully both the Clark Patent and the Clegg Patent for the 
same ground. 
Blue Ledge conceded, as it had to since it had no evidence to present, it simply 
did not know what happened between 1928 and 1930 to explain why both patents 
issued on the heels of Mr. Clegg's protest. Blue Ledge has never given answers or 
produced evidence or Land Office records that could possibly have carried its burden 
on summary judgment if the trial court had applied the parties' respective burdens 
properly. According to Blue Ledge's counsel, the Clark family and Mr. Clegg had been 
fighting against each other over land in the 1920's, Ms. Clark "confessed judgment" to 
Mr Clegg's protest but nevertheless "[w]e don't know what happened" after that and "[i]t 
looks like somebody made a clerical error." 
Since, even if Ms. Clark at one point in the Land Office proceeding conceded to 
Mr. Clegg's protest and the Land Office canceled her homestead entry to the extent it 
"conflicted" with the Clegg Patent, the Land Office's proceeded to issue the Clark 
Patent, it is reasonable to infer that the Land Office's action was based on its finding 
that no "conflict" would exist between the two patents, even though they encompassed 
the same land. Gillmor was not required to explain or come forward with any, let alone 
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further, evidence sustaining the validity of the Clark Patent. Nevertheless, Gillmor's 
counsel argued to the trial court the implausibility that the Land Office would engage in 
a meaningless and nugatory act, versus the plausibility that the Land Office ultimately 
adjudicated that it had something valid to convey to Ms. Clark. Furthermore, especially 
in light of Mr. Clegg's protest, it is plausible to infer that the Land Office would only have 
issued the Clark Patent if doing so was going to be in harmony with the Clegg Patent it 
had issued one year before. 
That argument posited to the trial court by Gillmor's counsel is supported by the 
Clark Patent itself. The Clark Patent contains the following language: 
"Excepting and reserving, however, to the United States all the coal and other 
minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect 
for, mine, and remove the same pursuant to the provisions and limitations of the 
Act of December 29, 1916 (39 Stat., 862)." 
Ex. A of Att. 1 to R. 358-383. The Clark Patent was issued, by its plain reference, 
under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act ("SRHA") of 1916. Id. Like every homestead 
patent that issued at the time, the Clark Patent contained the SRHA-required 
reservation "to the United States 'all the coal and other minerals' in the land." Watt v. 
Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 37-40, 130 S Ct 2218, 76 L.Ed 2d 400 (1983) 
(quoting SRHA); see also Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 505-506, 48 
S.Ct 580, 72 L.Ed 961 (1928)(equity suit by oil and gas leaseholder to enjoin 
homestead patentee from surface use incompatible with continued mining operations 
proper because lease included implied right to reasonably necessary surface use but 
not proper to cancel homestead patent for same land); Sunrise Valley, LLC .v. 
Kempthorne, 528 F.3d 1251, 1253 (10th Cir. May 20, 2008) (quoting Watt) 
(congressional purpose reserving mineral rights under SRHA was "to facilitate the 
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concurrent development of both surface and subsurface resources" because "ranching 
and farming do not ordinarily entail the extraction of mineral substances," and surface 
lands were patented "chiefly... for grazing and raising forage crops... for the support of a 
family"); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988). There is in 
fact a reasonable explanation for the issuance of the two patents, therefore, and that is 
that they do not conflict. The Land Office plainly determined to grant Ms. Clark all of 
the surface rights in the land except those reasonably necessary for mining under the 
mineral rights the United States reserved to itself. Having reserved the mining rights to 
itself in the Clark Patent, the United States saw fit to grant those mineral rights to Mr. 
Clegg. But Mr. Clegg would be limited in his use of the surface to those activities 
reasonably related to the reserved mineral rights the United States granted him. That 
explanation was rejected by the trial court without any evidence to support its rejection. 
This is a perfectly reasonable interpretation, entirely consistent with the express 
language of the Clark Patent, entirely consistent with the express language of the 
statute referenced in the Clark Patent and entirely likely given the Congressional 
mandate to the Land Office. Blue Ledge offered no evidence to refute this reasonable 
explanation and so failed in its burden on summary judgment. 
"Under this rule [UTAH R. CIV. P. 56], it is clear that if there is any genuine issue 
as to any material fact, the motion should be denied." Young v Felornia, 244 P.2d 862, 
863 (Utah 1952). "On summary judgment the adverse party is entitled to have the court 
survey the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to him." Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 395 P.2d 62, 63 (Utah 
1964). 
Ill 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LOOK TO FEDERAL LAW IN DETERMINING 
WHETHER BLUE LEDGE WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The trial court seemed to look solely to the date of issuance of the federal 
patents as a fact dispositive of whether the United States held any interest it could grant 
to Clark after the Clegg Patent was issued. That overlooked Gillmor's counsel's 
argument of the applicable federal law to the trial court, that Blue Ledge had the burden 
to "go back to the dates of the application^]... [and] the land office records, to show [the 
trial court] that the land office did not know what it was doing when it issued the Clark 
Patent, or that the Clark Patent was in fact not first in right, even though it was issued 
second in time." R. 000426 at 14-15. The ultimate question of whether any federal 
patent, Clark's or Clegg's or anyone else's, is thus not answered by resort to applying 
state law recording principles, which was the argument presented by Blue Ledge. 
R.340-342. . See generally, Proctor v. Painter, 15 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1926)("The 
question whether a patent from the United States for public lands is valid or invalid is 
not always one of easy solution" but evidence showed that the land office did not have 
jurisdiction to dispose of land and issue patent therefor). 
The trial court focused exclusively and therefore erroneously on the fact that the 
date of issuance of the Clegg Patent predated the date of issuance of the Clark Patent. 
In its citation to federal law, Blue Ledge relied exclusively on Proctor, and a string 
citation in Proctor's to support the argument that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved or 
appropriated are absolutely void." 15 F.2d at 975 (citations omitted).3 Blue Ledge 
failed to explain, however, what the Supreme Court's use of the phrase "reserved or 
3
 R. 000627 at 5. 
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appropriated" meant. In fact, federal law is clear that the date of "issuance" or "grant" is 
emphatically not what determines either the validity or scope of a patent that has 
issued. Instead, the date that an applicant's claim of right arose in favor of the patent 
application is determinative. See United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193, 196 (9th 
Cir. 1956)(citing cases). Proctor's use of the phrase "absolutely void" which was 
highlighted by Blue Ledge was plainly a reference to patents which had been subjected 
to an evidentiary showing that the lands claimed by the void patent had been 
"previously granted, reserved or appropriated." 
In the portion of the Proctor decision Blue Ledge omitted to bring to the trial 
court's attention, which immediately followed the portion of the opinion Blue Ledge 
quoted, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[o]n the other hand, if the Land Department has 
jurisdiction to dispose of the land and to issue a patent therefor, an erroneous 
determination of the facts upon which the right to a patent depends, or an entire 
failure to determine such facts, will not avoid the patent Id. (citing Burke v. 
Southern Pacific R. Co., 234 U.S. 669, 34 S. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527)(emphasis 
added). Applying that statement of law to this case, since the Land Office ultimately 
determined that the Clark Patent should issue- whether because her application or her 
claim of right preceded the claim of right of Clegg, or for some other reason not known 
to Gillmor, Blue Ledge or the trial court, the Clark Patent was found not to conflict with 
the Clegg Patent in the eyes of the Land Office. The Land Office is the administrative 
agency with jurisdiction to make such determinations. The Clark Patent reserved 
mineral rights and the Clegg Patent granted mineral rights. Clearly, Blue Ledge did not 
meet its burden under federal law to show that the Clark Patent would be void in the 
circumstances. 
17 
Given that Mr. Clegg had protested the Clark homestead application but the Land 
Office issued the Clark Patent anyway, it is at least possible that the Land Office 
intended the Clark Patent to be superior to the Clegg Patent, because there is case law 
that, when a patent issues, the title and claim of right that comes with the patent relates 
back to the date of the entry on the land. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d at 196 ("A patent from 
the United States operates to transfer the title, not merely from the date of the 
patent, but from the inception of the equitable right upon which it is based. 
[Emphasis added]". 
D. SINCE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT BLUE LEDGE MET ITS 
BURDEN, WHEN IT NEITHER ADDUCED SUFFICIENT UNCONTROVERTED 
EVIDENCE TO PREVAIL NOR SHOWING ENTITLEMENT AS A MATTER OF FEDERAL 
LAW, THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court did not apply the correct 
procedural summary judgment burden on Blue Ledge as set forth in Orvis, supra. A 
summary judgment movant on its own claim has an "affirmative duty to provide the 
court with facts that demonstrate both that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law and that there are no material issues of fact that would require resolution at trial." 
2008 UT 2,1J19, 117 P.3d at 605. It cannot be fairly said that Blue Ledge did that, and 
the trial court should have denied the summary judgment motion on Blue Ledge's claim. 
II. 43 U.S.C. § 1166 BARS BLUE LEDGE'S ATTACK OF THE CLARK PATENT. 
The trial court concluded that Blue Ledge could "collaterally] attack" the Clark 
Patent but Gillmor could not assert a statute of limitations defense. See Section IV.B., 
supra. These legal conclusions, which appellant challenges, infra., appear to have 
been based on the trial court's antecedent incorrect finding that the Land Office 
conveyed nothing to Ms. Clark in 1930 contrary to the presumption to which the Clark 
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patent was entitled and contrary to the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.4 
A. IF THE CLEGG PATENT CONVEYED ANYTHING, CLEGG AND BLUE LEDGE 
ARE SUCCESSORS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GILLMOR CAN ASSERT 
43 U.S.C. § 1166 AGAINST BLUE LEDGE. 
The trial court noted correctly that 43 U.S.C. § 1166 "applies only to the United 
States or its successors." See Section IV.B., supra, (emphasis added). Appellant 
respectfully submits that the trial court then erred in ruling that the statute "is not 
applicable here." Id. Under 43 U.S.C. § 1166, "suits by the United States to vacate and 
annul any patent shall only be brought within six years after the date of the issuance of 
such patents." LexisNexis 2008. 
In Wollan v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 997 F.Supp. 1397 (D.Colo. 1998), plaintiff 
Wollan sought a determination that he had a valid claim of right to acreage based on a 
mining claim that dated back to 1890 and asserted his claimed interest had priority over 
claims of others who had acquired title pursuant to a patent issued in 1986. Id. at 1399-
1400. The federal trial court ruled that the action was barred by the federal six-year 
statute of limitations, because it commenced 11 years after the 1986 patent. Id. at 
1401-1402. "Because only the government may contest and seek the cancellation 
4
 "Despite the language of the 1872 Mining Act that claimants 'shall have the 
exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all [the] surface,' courts have limited 
those rights to uses reasonably related to mining operations" U.S. v. Good, 257 F. 
Supp.2d 1306, 1309 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Col., 2003)(internal citations omitted); see also U.S. 
v Etcheverry, supra. 230 F.2d at 195. Blue Ledge does not even claim in this case to 
be the successor in interest to the mining estate associated with the Clegg Patent. Its 
claim is limited to the surface estate in the disputed property. However, as Gillmor 
believes it must have been , the Land Office conveyed the surface estate in 1930 to Ms. 
Clark with reservation of mineral rights. The Land Office had conveyed to Mr. Clegg in 
1929 those mineral rights which had been reserved out from Ms. Clark's first in time 
homestead patent entry and application filed back in 1917. If this is correct, Blue 
Ledge's claim in this case is to nothing at all. 
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of an issued patent, § 1166 applies with equal force when a third party stands in the 
shoes of the federal government to compel the vacatur or annulment of a patent." Id. at 
1401 (emphasis added). "Once the six-year statute of limitations for challenging a 
patent specified in 43 U.S.C. § 1166 expire[d], the patent [had] become[ ] 
unassailable." Id. at 1401-1402. 
Any action to challenge and seek annulment of the Clark Patent, brought by the 
United States or a third party like Blue Ledge, had to be filed no later than December 
20, 1936. Blue Ledge's suit was commenced more than seventy years after that date. 
Assuming the Clegg Patent conveyed something to Mr. Clegg, Mr. Clegg was plainly a 
successor in ownership to the United States. Blue Ledge's quiet title claim in this case is 
based entirely on itself being successor in interest to Mr. Clegg. Therefore, logically, Blue 
Ledge- like Mr. Clegg many years ago- is a successor to the United States if the Clegg 
Patent conveyed something. Mr. Clegg many years ago stood in the shoes of the federal 
government. Blue Ledge today stands in the shoes of the federal government and is 
subject to the statutory limitations of actions defense. 
After the Clark Patent issued, Mr. Clegg did not file an action to annul it within six 
years, or at all. This undisputed fact is enhanced by a second one: back in the 1920's 
and 1930's, Mr. Clegg knew of Ms. Clark's claim to the land, protested her patent 
application and still did nothing after it issued. Blue Ledge not only stands in the shoes of 
the federal government. It stands in the shoes of Mr. Clegg, and Mr. Clegg stood still 
when the Land Office issued the Clark Patent. The trial court should have found the Blue 
Ledge suit barred by 43 U.S.C. § 1166 because of when it was filed. 
/// 
/// 
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B. A RULING THAT THE CLARK PATENT CONVEYED NOTHING, OR ISSUED 
ERRONEOUSLY, DOES NOT PREVENT GILLMOR FROM ASSERTING 43 
U.S.C. § 1166 AGAINST BLUE LEDGE. 
At the 2005 summary judgment hearing, counsel for Gillmor reminded the trial 
court of the legal presumption that the Land Office conducted its activities properly and 
issued the close in time Clegg and Clark Patents in harmony with each other. R 
000426 at 17-18. However, even in the very unlikely event that the Land Office did not 
have anything to dispose of when it issued the Clark Patent, Blue Ledge's quiet title 
claim seeking its annulment still gets hung up on 43 U.S.C. § 1166. 
At that hearing, counsel also raised the case of Dept. of Transportation & Public 
Facilities v. First National Bank, 689 P.2d 483 (Alaska 1984). In that case, even though 
the subject patent had issued improperly, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed that 
Alaska stood in the shoes of the federal government for purposes of a suit that was 
effectively seeking to annul a patent. Id. at 486 n. 13. The state was "estopped to deny 
validity" of the patent because the six-year statute had run. Id. 
The trial court concluded on November 8, 2005, that the Clark Patent was void 
ab initio. This led to the trial court's conclusion that 43 U.S.C. § 1166 "is not applicable 
here." In other words, because the Court ruled that Gillmor got nothing she was not a 
successor in ownership to the United States, and therefore she could not stand in the 
shoes of the United States to assert the statute against Blue Ledge. However, even 
where a patent is void ab initio, 43 U.S.C. § 1166 prevents any challenge to the validity 
of the patent once the six-year limitations period has expired. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated: 
"It is said that the instrument was void and hence was no patent But 
the statute presupposes an instrument that might be declared void. 
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When it refers to 'any patent heretofore issued,' it describes the 
purport and source of the document, not its legal effect If the act 
were confined to valid patents it would be almost or quite without 
use. In form the statute only bars suits to annul the patent. But statutes 
of limitation, with regard to land, at least, which cannot escape from 
the jurisdiction, generally are held to affect the right, even if in terms 
only directed against the remedy. This statute must be taken to mean 
that the patent is to be held good and is to have the same effect against 
the United States that it would have had if it had been valid in the first 
place. 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 450 (1908) 
(emphasis added)(internal citations omitted); see also, State of Louisiana v. Garfield, 
211 U.S. 70, 77 (1908) (citing with approval United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water 
Power Co. where "it was decided that this act applied to patents even if void because of 
a previous reservation of the land, and it was said that the statute not merely took away 
the remedy but validated the patent"). 
C. APPLICATION OF 43 U.S.C. § 1166 To BLUE LEDGE'S CLAIM Is 
CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF REPOSE IN STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
"Statutes of limitations are not designed exclusively for the benefit of individuals 
but are also for the public good. These statutes of repose are intended to prevent the 
revival and enforcement of stale demands; against which it may be difficult to defend, 
because of lapse of time, fading of memory, and possible loss of documents." Hirtler v. 
Hirtler, 566 P.2d 1231, 1231 (Utah 1977). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court 
stated long ago: 
"The defense of the statute of limitations is not a technical defense but 
substantial and meritorious. The great weight of modern authority is to this 
effect. . . . Such statutes are not only statutes of repose, but they supply 
the place of evidence lost or impaired by lapse of time by raising a 
presumption which renders proof unnecessary. . . . Statutes of limitation 
are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are 
found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. They 
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promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. An 
important public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate to activity 
and punish negligence. While time is constantly destroying the evidence 
of rights, they supply its place by a presumption which renders proof 
unnecessary. Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a 
conclusive bar. The bane and antidote go together. . . . They are founded 
upon the general experience of mankind that claims, which are valid, are 
not usually allowed to remain neglected. The lapse of years without any 
attempt to enforce a demand creates, therefore, a presumption against its 
original validity, or that it has ceased to subsist. This presumption is made 
by these statutes a positive bar; and they thus become statutes of repose, 
protecting parties from the prosecution of stale claims, when, by loss of 
evidence from death of some witnesses, and the imperfect recollection of 
others, or the destruction of documents, it might be impossible to 
establish the truth." 
United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1922) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
The Clark Patent issued in 1930. The reasonable inference is that it issued in 
harmony with the 1929 Clegg Patent. That is probably why Mr. Clegg never instituted 
an annulment action. After all, he had protested the original Clark patent application. 
Blue Ledge is the first to challenge the Clark Patent, yet Blue Ledge "does not know 
what happened." R. 628 at 23. It may be impossible for Blue Ledge to obtain witness 
testimony or records explaining what happened between the end of the protest and the 
issuance of the Clark Patent. Yet, appellant strenuously disagrees with the trial court 
that there is "no possible benefit in making a factual determination about the incidents 
of that day [and] [njothing could be provided that is meaningful, in the court's mind, to 
the events of that day and why things happened as they did." See Section IV.C, supra. 
Not only should summary judgment have been denied on Blue Ledge's counterclaim, 
Blue Ledge's failure to be able to locate the salient facts from the past demonstrates 
the type of prejudice that repose in a statute of limitations seeks to avoid. Accordingly, 
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43 U.S. C. § 1166 should bar Blue Ledge's attempt to annul and cancel the Clark 
Patent. In sum, there is no legitimate basis on which Blue Ledge can assail and 
invalidate the Clairk Patent, but there is an applicable statutory bar to Blue Ledge's 
claim which Gillmor can properly assert. This court should reverse the trial court's 
contrary conclusions and remand. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT UNJUSTLY REWARDED BLUE LEDGE FOR ITS DELAY IN 
SEEKING A FINAL JUDGMENT WHILE SUBJECTING GILLMOR TO A PENALTY FOR 
THE SAME DELAY BY DISMISSING GILLMOR'S ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM. 
After the trial court's 2005 denial of summary judgment on the adverse possession 
claim and grant of partial summary judgment on the quiet title counterclaim, neither party 
took any action to move the case toward a final judgment. Ultimately, Gillmor broached 
the topic of settlement with Blue Ledge in September 2007 and notified Blue Ledge that 
she would move the case forward if there were no settlement Ex. A to R. 595-602. 
Blue Ledge's response was to turn Gillmor's stated intent to move the case forward into 
an opportunity to divert attention from its own failure to move the case toward final 
judgment. Despite the fact that Blue Ledge had obtained no final judgment on its 
affirmative claims and had allowed them to languish, Blue Ledge moved for dismissal 
with prejudice of Gillmor's adverse possession claim, alone. Gillmor therefore both filed 
her motion to revisit and certified the action as ready for trial. R. 461-462. 
In October 2007, Blue Ledge moved to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession 
claim for failure to prosecute. On December 5, 2007, when the trial court heard Blue 
Ledge's motion to dismiss, it asked counsel for Blue Ledge to explain its own inaction 
and counsel's response was "we done [sic] everything we could to prosecute our 
claim, and we were done." R. 628 at 24. On December 7, 2007, the trial court granted 
Blue Ledge's motion. R 550-552. On December 14, 2007, Blue Ledge submitted a 
24 
proposed form of order to which Gillmor objected on December 24, 2007, because the 
proposed order purported that the Court granted Blue Ledge affirmative relief for which it 
had not moved, wz., entry of a decree/judgment quieting title in specifically described real 
property. R. 566-570 & 555-557. On December 31, 2007, the trial court ruled that it 
would not sign Blue Ledge's proposed order: 
"The Court agrees with plaintiff that the proposed order grants more relief than the 
Court's intended order which simply dismissed plaintiffs claims for failure to 
prosecute. The Court will not execute the proposed order." 
R. 563. 
Only then, after that message from and statement of the trial court, did Blue 
Ledge move, on January 7, 2008, for entry of a final judgment and an order with a legal 
description of the disputed property. R. 573-575. Blue Ledge thus waited twenty six 
months, more than two years after the trial court's summary judgment ruling, to 
seek the affirmative relief it wanted on its counterclaim. All along, it knew had to do 
something to complete its case. It did nothing but point a finger at Gillmor's delay when 
she raised the possibility of settlement. Then, in being heard on its motion to dismiss 
Gillmor's remaining claim for her failure to prosecute, Blue Ledge told the trial court it 
had nothing else to do on its counterclaim, when it actually did. 
Parties to a lawsuit have equal obligations to move their affirmative claims 
forward. However, the trial court dismissed Gillmor's claim for delay though she had 
certified it ready for trial. Blue Ledge had done nothing for an even longer period of 
time on its counterclaim and was awarded dismissal of Gillmor's claim and a final 
judgment on its own. "Whether delay is a ground for the dismissal of an action is to be 
determined on the totality of the circumstances. This includes the conduct of both 
parties and the opportunity each has had to move the case forward if they so desired] 
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and also what, if any, difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other party by 
the delay; and most important, whether it appears that any injustice has resulted." 
Department of Social Servs. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980)(citing 
cases)(emphasis added); see also, Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 
389, 393, 335 P.2d 624 (1959). The Utah Supreme Court in Crystal Lime was faced 
with a case wherein both parties were seeking to quiet title and had done nothing in the 
case for eight years when the counterclaimant filed a motion to dismiss: 
"Respondents' contentions might be very persuasive if they had not filed 
counterclaims in the action asking that title be quieted in them and also asking 
that in the event title was not quieted in them that appellant herein be required to 
reimburse them the amounts they expended for taxes. In asking for such 
affirmative relief they were in effect cross-complainants in the action. . . Since 
any party to this action could have obtained the relief to which it was 
entitled at any time it had wanted but both parties chose to dally for a 
number of years, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant 
respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice.11 
335 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added). In Romero, as in Crystal Lime, the state high court 
did not reward the moving party when they had delayed as well: "we are not impressed 
with either fairness or propriety in one party sitting silently by for a long period of time, 
then attempting to blame the other party for the delay." 609 P.2d at 1325. 
Blue Ledge has been every bit as dilatory in pursuing final resolution of its 
counterclaim as Gillmor in pursuing her remaining claim. Had Gillmor not broached 
settlement in September 2007, Blue Ledge would undoubtedly still be doing nothing to 
move its counterclaim to final resolution or to try and terminate Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim one way or another if that was what was standing in its way. Gillmor 
has not caused Blue Ledge any delay. Further, Gillmor is the party who certified that 
claim ready for trial. If at any time, between the 2005 summary judgment ruling and 
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Gillmor's filing of the trial readiness certificate in October 2007, Blue Ledge had been 
earnest about needing a court order with a legal description of the disputed property to 
accompany the quiet title ruling in its favor, it could have and would have sought one. 
Nothing was ever stopping it from doing so. Additionally, if Blue Ledge was sincere that 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) presented it with a procedural problem and the 
adverse possession claim was "the only thing stopping [it] from getting [a] final 
judgment," then Blue Ledge would have asked for a trial date to force the issue and 
dispose of the rest of the case. R. 663 at 9. Those are the steps that Blue Ledge 
would have taken had it wanted to try and obtain a prompt final judgment. Instead, 
Blue Ledge sat on its hands for over two years and would still be doing so had Gillmor 
not acted. 
In sum, the trial court declined to dismiss Blue Ledge's counterclaim in light of its 
inaction but dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute Gillmor's claim that she 
had certified for trial. Taken together, these decisions of the trial court are inconsistent. 
One of them does not tolerate delay. One of them does. In that respect, they are 
fundamentally unfair and constitute an abuse of discretion. Justice requires that this 
Court set aside the dismissal of Gillmor's adverse possession claim and remand it for 
trial. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellees respectfully requests that the judgment 
of the trial court be reversed, in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of October, 2008. 
PETERS SCOFIELD 
A Professional Corporation 
DAVID \A[. SCCDFIELC 
R. REED PRUTN GO¥.DSTEI{ 
Attorneys for the Appellees 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, this OOj^ay of 
October, 2008, to the following: 
Rosemary J. Beless 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
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On November 8, 2005, the court granted defendant Blue Ledge Corporation's 
motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim quieting title in Blue Ledge Coiporation to the 
following described real property, and the court having now dismissed all other claims in this 
action, now enters i1s final judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Defendant Blue Ledge Corporation is the sole and exclusive owner of the 
following real property, Blue Ledge Corporation is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession 
of the following real property, and neither plaintiff Nadine Gillmor nor any other person has any 
estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to the following real property: 
The surface estate of those portions of the Woodrow 
No. 6, Clegg No. 2, and the Clegg No. 3 patented 
mining claims, situated in the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 11, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, SLB&M, 
Summit County, Utah. 
o> u ii d! fc H 
2 
DATED this U day of 
Honorable Bruce Lubeck 
District Court Judge 
ND: 4846-2412-1346, Ver 1 
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The above matter came before the court for decision on Blue 
Ledge's request to submit concerning a proposed order. The court 
issued a Ruling and Order December 7, 2007. That remains the 
final order of the court and as indicated therein no further 
order is required. The court agrees with plaintiff that the 
proposed order grants more relief than the court's intended order 
which simply dismissed plaintiff's claims for failure to 
prosecute. The court will not execute the proposed order. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARK CITY COUNTRY CLUB ESTATES, 
et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
y 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 940600087 PR 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: December 7, 2007 
This matter came before the Court on December 5, 2007 
for oral arguments on defendant Blue Ledge's motion to dismiss 
for failure to prosecute. 
Blue Ledge filed its motion to dismiss October 9, 2007, 
plaintiff opposed it October 25, 2007, and Blue Ledge replied in 
support on November 5, 2007. 
At the eleventh hour, on December 3, 2007, the court 
received plaintiff Gillmor's (Gillmor) request to submit on a 
motion to reconsider. Gillmor filed her motion to reconsider the 
court's 2005 grant of summary judgment on October 25, 2007. Blue 
Ledge filed an opposition November 13, 2007. Gillmor replied and 
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EXHIBITA 
requested to submit for decision on December 3, 2007. Plaintiff 
asked that the court consider this motions with the previously 
scheduled motion to dismiss. On the day prior to oral arguments, 
defendant submitted a motion for and a proposed surreply. 
Although the court would not normally consider such a 
request to hold oral arguments on such short notice, because the 
motion is integral to the motion to dismiss and the court wishes 
to proceed in this case given the inordinate prior delays the 
court permitted the parties to argue both motions at oral 
arguments. 
Plaintiff Gillmor was present through Ronald F. Price and 
Blue Ledge was present through Rosemary J. Beless and P. Bruce 
Badger. Before the hearing the court considered the memoranda and 
other materials submitted by the parties and after the hearing, 
the court took the issues under advisement. Since taking the 
issues under advisement, the court has further and more carefully 
those materials and considered the law and facts relating to the 
issues. Now being fully advised, the court renders the following 
Ruling and Order. 
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MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
In the thirteen years that have elapsed since Gillmor filed 
her complaint the following has occurred: the court ordered 
plaintiff to prosecute her case on four prior occasions; 
plaintiff filed three amended complaints; Blue Ledge asserted a 
counterclaim to quiet title in August 1995, which the court 
granted summary judgment on in November 2005. Plaintiff now 
requests this court reconsider that grant of summary judgment 
entered two years ago. 
"Trial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change 
their position with respect to any orders or decisions as long as 
no final judgment has been rendered." Brookside Mobile Home Park 
v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 3118 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, 
although courts generally discourage motions to reconsider "they 
have become the cheatgrass of the litigation landscape. . . . 
[T]he extraordinary circumstance may arise when it is appropriate 
to request a trial court to reconsider a ruling. These occasions 
are rare." Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, 118. Such circumstances 
may arise when: 
(1) [T]he matter is presented in a 'different light' or 
under 'different circumstances;' (2) there has been a 
-3-
change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new 
evidence; (4) ^manifest injustice' will result if the 
court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court 
needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was 
inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the 
court. 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (UT App. 
1994(citation omitted). At a minimum for a court to properly 
consider a motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment a 
question of fact must exist. Brookside, f 18. 
In 2005 the court determined there was no dispute of 
material fact on the issue of Blue Ledge's patent: "the court 
finds no factual disputes that are material and judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law to defendant." The court also noted 
"The statute of limitations applies only to the United States or 
its successors, and is not applicable here." 
Plaintiff brought a "Motion to Revisit the Court's Ruling 
That Defendant Blue Ledge Corporation is Entitled to Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Whether its Claim is Barred by the 
Applicable Federal Statute of Limitations." Gillmor requests the 
court reconsider summary judgment because Gillmor believes the 
court's conclusion on this single issue "is erroneous as a matter 
of law." Gillmor does not contest any other issue involved in the 
court's 2005 decision but Gillmor does attempt to introduce facts 
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that now create a factual dispute. 
The court expected plaintiff to draw its attention to some 
change in law or evidence or circumstances that would have 
rendered this conclusion of law in doubt. Plaintiff has done no 
such thing nor does plaintiff dispute this. Rather, the court 
discovered that plaintiff has only reiterated the arguments she 
made and lost on two years ago. She specifically states "as set 
forth in plaintiff's memorandum opposing Blue Ledge's motion for 
summary judgment" and Gillmor then proceeds to again set forth 
and elaborate on her same arguments that did not prevail two full 
years ago. 
In 2005 the portion of plaintiff's motion related to the 
statute of limitations was slightly more than a page long. That 
page of the 2005 argument included the same citation to the case 
she elaborates on now. The 2007 motion differs only in length, 
which derives from an extended discussion of this and other cases 
all of which had been decided in 2005 on the application of the 
statute of limitations. These cases and arguments were clearly 
available to plaintiff two years ago. 
Although plaintiff titles her motion as one to reconsider 
the application of the statute of limitations she also attempts 
to reargue that the 1930 patent is not void. She reargues this 
claim with reference to cases that were available to her, but 
which she chose not to apply, when she opposed summary judgment 
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in 2005. The court believes that the cases relied on did not and 
do not support plaintiff's arguments. 
No case cited by plaintiff nor any of her reiterated 
arguments give the court reason to reconsider its conclusion of 
law. The court stands by its determination that "[t]he 1929 
patent makes any further attempts at conveyance, or any later 
patents of the same or a different kind, void ab initio." This 
meant the United States did not have title to convey in 1930, and 
thus that the statute of limitations is inapplicable to 
plaintiff's claims. Absent any sound reason to reconsider the 
court's determination on the effect of the 1929 conveyance, the 
court sees no justification to reconsider its conclusion of law 
that the statute of limitations does not apply. 
In the surreply Blue Ledge makes clear, with the 
attachments, that there was and is no factual dispute concerning 
the issuance of the Clegg patent in 1929. It is beyond factual 
dispute that Blue Ledge's predecessor received patent title 
before Gillmor's predecessor and a genuine issue of material fact 
is not created by the claimed "protest" documents of Gillmor's 
predecessor. 
Plaintiff may, with 20/20 hindsight, wish she had made 
different arguments two years ago, but a motion to reconsider is 
not the proper place to argue what a party wishes they had 
argued, particularly when the cases do not support those 
-6-
arguments. Simple discontent with a court's adverse conclusion of 
law does not entitle a party to have the court revisit it. If 
that were so the court would be deluged with such requests as one 
party almost always believes the court has misperceived the law. 
The court rejects plaintiff's motion to reconsider its grant of 
summary judgment both procedurally and on the merits. Again, 
this motion was filed over 23 months after the prior November 8, 
2005, ruling. 
The court notes, given Utah courts' well-established 
disfavor of motions to reconsider, plaintiff would have been 
better advised to spend her efforts prosecuting the remaining 
adverse possession claim in this case, or making a timely 60(b) 
request or seeking permission for an interlocutory appeal. That 
she did not, and that she relies on cases and arguments available 
to her in 2005, is material to the court's ruling on defendant's 
motion to dismiss as well in denying this motion to reconsider. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Blue Ledge requests the court dismiss the action brought by 
plaintiff for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff objects to Blue 
Ledge's motion, arguing that when parties have asserted 
counterclaims, they too are responsible to prosecute the case. 
Defendant asserts that although plaintiff has filed notices 
of depositions, no depositions have actually occurred. In fact no 
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discovery has occurred since 1995. This lack of depositions or 
other discovery bolsters the court's belief that there is no new 
reason it should reconsider the prior grant of summary judgment. 
The fact that plaintiff filed her 54(b) motion does not 
demonstrate to the court that plaintiff is prosecuting her claims 
with due diligence. Instead, it looks like another attempt to 
avoid actually prosecuting her claims. Gillmor filed a 
certificate of readiness in conjunction with the motion to 
reconsider and the court fails completely to understand why that 
claim was not certified as ready for trial immediately after the 
November 2005 ruling. Blue Ledge had prevailed on its only claim 
and had no reason to pursue anything as it had no claim to 
pursue. 
"When a 'trial court has provided plaintiffs 'an opportunity 
to be heard and to do justice, f and that plaintiff abuses its 
opportunity through inexcusable neglect, the trial court does not 
abuse its discretion in dismissing the case/" Country Meadows 
Convalescent Ctr. v. Department of Health, Div. of Health Care 
Fin., 851 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
When the court considers the thirteen years that have 
elapsed; the ample opportunity plaintiff has had to move this 
case forward, most especially since November 2005 when nothing 
was done at all until at least September 2007 when Gillmor 
asserts settlement negotiations began; her lack of action overall 
-8-
in the case concerning discovery; that most of plaintiffs steps 
to prosecute her case have generally been in response to a court 
order or a motion requiring her to do so; that Blue Ledge has had 
its counterclaims granted and has nothing left to pursue and that 
the court has determined it will not reconsider that grant of 
summary judgment; that Blue Ledge has waited thirteen years to 
develop its land, the court is lead to the conclusion that the 
only injustice that would result would be in not dismissing this 
case. 
Blue Ledge's motion to dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this / day of December, 2007. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF 
iGBDVEfhl 
NOV 1 0 2005 
STRICT 
UTAH 
NADINE GILMOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES, BLUE 
LEDGE CORPORATION, SUSAN A. 
MEGUR, STEVE MEGUR, JOHN J. 
CUMMINGS, SUSAN S. CUMMINGS, 
EREMALOS DEVELOPMENT, THE 
ESTATE OF CHARLES F. GILLMOR, 
et.al., 
Defendants. 
BLUE LEDGE CORPORATION, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
NADINE GILMOR, et.al., 
Counterdefendants 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 940300087 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: November 8, 2005 
The above matter came before the court on November 7, 2005, 
for oral argument on Blue Ledge's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff was present with David W. Scofield and Thomas W. 
Peters, United Park City Mines and Blue Ledge were present 
through Rosemary J. Beless and P. Bruce Badger. Blue Ledge filed 
this motion on February 25, 2005. Plaintiff filed an opposition 
response on April 5, 2005. Blue Ledge filed a reply on May 6, 
2005. A notice to submit was filed by Plaintiff on May 19, 
2005. Oral argument was scheduled and postponed by the parties 
\y\ 
and eventually held November 7, 2005. The court took the matter 
under advisement. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and 
heard oral argument, and concludes as follows. 
ARGUMENTS 
Blue Ledge (Defendant) moved for summary judgment quieting 
title and declaring plaintiff has failed to prove adverse 
possession. 
In March, 1996, a settlement and dismissal was entered 
dismissing all plaintiff's claims against all but this defendant 
Blue Ledge and there remains at issue plaintiff7 s adverse 
possession claim against Blue Ledge and Blue Ledge's counterclaim 
seeking to quiet title to the same real property- Plaintiff 
filed a motion for summary judgment in 1996 on those issues but 
withdrew it later that year. Defendant claims in 1999 plaintiff 
deeded her right in the property to another, but in 2004 she 
received her claim back and now retains her status as a party in 
interest. 
The issue is who owns what defendant calls the Clegg and 
Woodrow Mining Claims or Patented claims or Clegg Patents. 
Defendant asserts fee title went from the United States to United 
Park City Mines (UPCM) in 1929, and in 1930 the United States 
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issued a homestead (or grazing) patent for property to Johanna 
Clark, predecessor of plaintiff, which should have excluded the 
patented claims since the former were patented on May 22, 1929. 
In 1994, UPCM, and then this defendant, included the Clegg 
Patented claims in a proposed subdivision being developed. 
Plaintiff then filed this action to quiet title in the Patented 
claims or for declaratory judgment plaintiff owned the Patented 
Claims by adverse possession. On May 25, 1995, UPMC transferred 
title to the surface estate of the Patented Claims to Blue Ledge, 
and only the surface estate of the Patented Claims is at issue. 
Defendant claims as undisputed facts that the property at 
issue is a portion of the surface estate of the Patented Claims 
situated in the Northwest Quarter of Section 11, Township 2, 
South, Range 4 East, SLB&M. Fee title, including both surface 
and mineral estates, was conveyed from the United States to 
Charles L. Clegg, predecessor of UPCM and Blue Ledge, by patent 
dated May 22, 1929. On December 20, 1930, the United States 
issues a homestead patent to Johanna A. Clark, covering 479 acres 
and including some of the same area as the previous Clegg 
patents. Those Clark patents included the Patented Claims or 
Clegg patent. Those Clegg Patents are shown on a Supplemental 
Plan recorded August 7, 1935. Plaintiff claims ownership through 
the Clark Patent. Clegg, on July 26, 1929, conveyed fee title to 
Silver King by Mining Deed, recorded August 1, 1929. On March 16, 
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1983, Silver King conveyed fee title to UPCM, who on May 25, 
1995, transferred title to the surface estate of the Patented 
Claims to Blue Ledge, but UPCM retained the mineral estate in a 
Special Warranty Deed recorded June 2, 1995. On August 19, 1982, 
this court quieted title in UPCM to the Clegg Patent, which was 
affirmed on appeal. UPCM v. Clegg, 737 P.2d 173 (Utah 1987). 
UPCM has used the property from 1982. Beginning in 1991, UPCM, 
now Blue Ledge as successor, have been designing and developing 
the Hidden Meadows Subdivision, which encompassed the Clegg 
Patent. Those efforts include road construction and curb and 
gutter, sewer, phone and power lines, and the Clegg Patents are 
now prepared for residential development as part of that 
subdivision. 
Blue Ledge argues it holds paramount record title and so 
title should be quieted in its favor. Blue Ledge must prevail on 
the strength of its own claim, not the weakness of plaintiff s 
claim. Where both parties claim title through different chains, 
each must prove its right to title. To quiet title one must show 
a claim of title which entitles the party to possession and that 
the interest claimed by others is adverse or hostile to the 
alleged claim of title or interest. 
Priority of time governs competing interests according to 
defendant, and the highest evidence of title is that from the 
United States in a patent. Defendant claims it has shown prima 
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facie evidence of title and thus the burden is on plaintiff to 
controvert the evidence of title. The United States could not 
convey to Clark in 1930 any rights by a grazing or homestead 
patent, as the United States no longer held and could not cut off 
existing vested rights held by the owner of the 1929 Patented 
Claims, the Clegg Patents. Plaintiff clearly has claimed an 
interest that is hostile to that of Blue Ledge. 
Plaintiff is claimed to have failed in her efforts to show 
adverse possession also. To prove that claim, plaintiff must 
have paid all taxes on the property and be in actual, open, 
notorious and exclusive possession of the property for seven 
continuous years. Plaintiff must strictly comply with those 
elements and it is argued she cannot prove them. 
Plaintiff has not been in actual possession as she claims. 
There must be actual occupation under such circumstances that the 
owner, or a person of ordinary prudence, would know, that the 
land was being held by another. Thus, plaintiff's claim of 
leasing the property to a third party for grazing is not 
sufficient. Use of property outside the Clegg Patents is not 
sufficient either. 
Plaintiff has not given notice of adverse possession, and if 
grazing is claimed as the use, the owner must have actual notice. 
Plaintiff did not improve the land or give notice in that manner 
of her claimed occupation, even though that opportunity was 
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available. 
Plaintiff's use was not exclusive as against the title 
holder, it did not operate as an ouster of the true owner, and it 
was not continuous for seven years. If the claim is based on 
grazing, the grazing must be continuous through the grazing 
season and period for the entire seven years. UPCM used ,the 
property as a parachute drop for the U.S. Air Force, weekly 
mountain bike trails, tours, and for production of a television 
commercial. From 1991 to 1996 the property was used by UPCM as 
part of the designed subdivision, thus plaintiff has not ousted 
the true owner. 
Plaintiff must also show, according to defendant, that the 
use must be for its ordinary use, and this land is not suitable 
for sheep grazing. This land is not pasture, but hilly sage and 
oak covered land. 
The affidavits attached show that from 1991, one of the 
developers of the subdivision has not seen livestock grazing on 
the property and that work on the subdivision has been ongoing 
since 1995. In 1983 UPCM entered into agreements with the U.S. 
Air Force to allow the property to be used as a drop zone for 
parachutists. Touring and bike competitions were held and a 
television commercial was filed on the property. 
In opposition, plaintiff disputes several facts relied on by 
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defendant, as well as the meaning, or interpretation, of some 
facts that are not disputed. Plaintiff asserts that the United 
States conveyance to Clegg was for the mining estate and not the 
surface estate. Plaintiff disputes that Clegg conveyed fee title 
to Silver King, and thus disputes the 1973 conveyance to UPCM and 
the UPCM conveyance to Blue Ledge, again claiming that the 
surface estate was not conveyed. Plaintiff disputes any 
significance of the Utah Supreme Court case of UPCM v. Clegg, as 
plaintiff was not a party and no claims of plaintiffs ownership 
were adjudicated in that case. Plaintiff also contests and 
disputes that the land at issue was used by UPCM for various 
purposes, though plaintiff does not deny agreements existed for 
such, and asserts the only use of the land was by plaintiff or 
her lessees. 
Plaintiff claims that the federal statute, 43 USC 1166, 
requires challenges to Homestead Patents be made within 6 years, 
which patent was granted in the 1930s. 
Plaintiff also contends her use of the land has been 
consistent with her patent, and defendant is not using the land 
consistent with the mining patent defendant claims. Because 
plaintiff is using the land consistent with her homestead patent, 
and defendant is not using the land consistent with a mining 
patent, plaintiff's title is superior. 
Plaintiff also argues that the patent issued by the United 
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states cannot Joe attacked by a third party. The grazing or 
homestead patent is superior title which is clear evidence of 
title. Plaintiff argues it must be presumed the United States was 
correct in issuing a Homestead Patent a year after a Mining 
Patent. Thus, the prior patent does not make it superior to the 
later patent. The subject matter of the two patents is different. 
As to the adverse possession claim of plaintiff, plaintiff 
claims there are genuine issues of material fact. The Utah 
statutes on adverse possession require certain factors to be 
present and plaintiff alleges there are disputes about whether 
some of those factors are present. 
Plaintiff claims title under a written instrument. 
Plaintiff claims there was continuous possession from not 
only 1987, but from 1983, through 1994. Unenclosed property is 
considered occupied and possessed if used for pasturage or for 
the ordinary use of the occupant. This land was used by 
plaintiff in the ordinary usage of grazing in the proper seasons. 
Plaintiff claims the land is taxed as agricultural and so 
defendant's assertion that there has never been any grazing is at 
issue. 
The use has also been adverse and this put defendant on 
notice. Plaintiff contacted UPCM in 1983 to discuss the 
"overlapping" deeds and that amounted to notice of adverse and 
open use. 
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Plaintiff paid taxes since 1983 at least. 
Affidavits and documents attached show that grazing occurred 
yearly and that taxes were paid by plaintiff. 
In reply, defendant again argues the United States conveyed 
fee title to the predecessor of Blue Ledge in 1929. That is said 
to be a matter of law discernible from the patent. Thereafter, 
the United States had no title and could not convey anything to 
plaintiffs predecessor in 1930 as plaintiff claims. The land 
involves portions of the surface estate of three patented mining 
claims. 
Defendant claims there are only two facts that matter, and 
those are (l)that the 1929 conveyance precedes the conveyance 
plaintiff relies on, and (2) defendant used the land while 
plaintiff claims to have obtained it by adverse possession. 
Defendant argues that the dispute about the 1929 patent is a 
legal, not a factual dispute. Similarly, there is no dispute 
about the adverse possession claim facts, as plaintiff only 
argues she did not observe UPCM use of the property, but that she 
did use it. Plaintiff has not disputed that the property was used 
by defendants and its predecessors. 
As a matter of law, a mining patent conveys surface and 
mining estates, unless the surface estate is reserved. Recording 
does not matter with patents from the United States. When the 
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United States patents land, subsequent attempts by the United 
States to patent that same land are void, as the United States 
cannot convey the land again."The second conveyance is void from 
the beginning and thus plaintiff has no title. 
As to adverse possession, defendant was not ousted and there 
is no dispute but that defendant used the land, and plaintiff did 
not exclusively use the land. While the court would like to give 
a presumption of regularity to the 1930 patent, the court sees no 
possible benefit in making a factual determination about the 
incidents of that day. Nothing could be provided that is 
meaningful, in the court's mind, to the events of that day and 
why things happened as they did. No witnesses could shed any 
light on motivation or meaning, and the court believes the 1929 
patent conveys title and it is unbroken to defendant. 
DISCUSSION 
QUIET TITLE. 
As to the motion concerning this claim of defendants, the 
court finds no factual disputes that are material and judgment 
should be granted as a matter of law to defendant. 
The 1929 patent makes any further attempts at conveyance, or 
any later patents of the same or a different kind, void ab 
initio. The statute of limitations applies only to the United 
States or its successors, and is not applicable here. A 
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collateral attack on the homestead patent is allowed by 
defendant. The court sees nothing but a legal dispute about the 
effect of these 1929 and 1930 patents. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
The court believes there are factual disputes that preclude 
summary judgment on that claim. 
Defendant claims the period of claimed adverse possession is 
from 1987 to 1994, and plaintiff cannot show ouster as from 1991 
defendant has been developing the area. However, plaintiff's 
affidavit, contrary to her memorandum, asserts adverse possession 
beginning in 1983, and so the adverse possession claim is "ripe" 
by 1990. Payment of taxes is not contested for purposes of this 
motion, but only the "ouster" element. 
The court sees genuine disputes over how long the property 
was possessed by plaintiff, what the conditions of the land were, 
and whether others used the property and what those uses were and 
when they occurred. While plaintiff's affidavit leaves something 
to be desired as far as the degree of knowledge about other use, 
the court does not believe that at this point the court can say 
plaintiff has failed to create a dispute about whether others 
used the property, or were "ousted" in a given period of time. 
Summary judgment is not proper on this claim. 
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The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to defendant's 
quiet title claim and DENIED as to plaintiff's adverse possession 
claim. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this day of '/&</ , 2005. 
BY THE-"COURT: 
^ 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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